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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
SPACECRAFT STRUCTURAL WINDOWS 
By Orvis E. Pigg a n d  Stanley P. Weiss 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The Apollo command module and lunar module window structural design and veri- 
fication experience is presented. The design philosophy, design criteria,  hardware, 
qualification and acceptance tests,  problems, and problem resolutions are discussed. 
Instrument windows and guidance and navigation optics were not considered to be 
structural items during their design and had to be structurally verified late in  the pro- 
gram. In addition to the lack of a good window definition, which contributed to inade- 
quate structural design and verification rigor, a general misunderstanding of the 
structural characteristics of glass by design engineers was  noted. 
A structural window definition is proposed to identify glass structures that should 
be verified flightworthy. A spacecraft window is structurally defined as any piece of 
glass that is thermally o r  mechanically stressed and will  endanger either the crew o r  
mission success if it breaks. 
Fracture mechanics is the best means known today to understand, explain, and 
evaluate the structural characteristics of glass and to provide a structural rationale 
for specifying proof-test requirements. Use of fracture mechanics in all future win- 
dow designs and evaluations is proposed to ensure acceptable window designs and to 
eliminate the misunderstanding of the structural characteristics of glass. 
I NTRO DUCT I ON 
The significant aspects of the structural design and verification of the Apollo com- 
mand module (CM) and lunar module (LM) windows are presented in  this report. Design 
philosophy and criteria,  hardware configuration, qualification testing, acceptance test- 
ing, and problems encountered (with resolutions) a r e  discussed. Also presented are 
brief discussions of the structural characteristics of glass and of fracture mechanics 
analysis of glass. Information concerning Apollo window contamination is given in 
reference 1. 
A spacecraft window is structurally defined as any piece of glass that is thermally 
o r  mechanically s t ressed and will endanger the crew o r  mission success if it breaks. 
This definition was not used during the design of the CM and LM. The lack of definition 
contributed to inadequate structural  design and verification of some glass i tems that are 
not normally considered structural. 
Nine CM windows and four LM windows were integral par t s  of the Apollo space- 
craft  primary pressure vessels (habitable volumes). Also, there were many glass in- 
strument covers in the CM and LM that were not part  of the primary pressure  vessels 
but which sealed and protected the instruments f rom the spacecraft environment. The 
structural  integrity of these windows affected crew safety and mission success to vary- 
ing degrees. Windows and glass structures were not treated as a separate technology 
during the Apollo spacecraft design and development; therefore, consistent design phi- 
losophy and design cr i ter ia  were not used initially throughout the program. This situa- 
tion was recognized late in the Apollo Program during a NASA Lyndon B. Johnson space'  
Center (JSC), formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), review of-glass structural  
characteristics and the analytical tools for  design, analysis, and verification of glass 
structure.  It was also determined that the structural  characteristics of glass were not 
well understood by window designers. This review identified fracture mechanics as the 
best analytical means available to evaluate the structural  integrity of glass and to pro- 
vide a structural rational f o r  specifying proof- test  requirements. Fracture mechanic 
techniques were used to reevaluate the glass structure in the CM and LM; this method 
resulted in some modifications and some requalification and reverification tests.  
STRUCTURAL CHARACTER1 ST ICS OF GLASS 
Both tempered and annealed glass were used for Apollo spacecraft windows. A 
brief discussion of the structural  characterist ics of glass is included to introduce the 
CM and LM structural design philosophy and structural  design cr i ter ia .  
Essentially, glass is a noncrystalline, supercooled liquid that is isotropic and 
elastic. Two conditions, tensile s t r e s s  and surface flaws, are required for  a fracture 
in glass, which has  an inherent strength (without flaws) in the range of 1 to 3 million 
psi .  All bulk glass,  such as window material, has microflaws caused by manufacture 
and handling that reduce i t s  strength. In addition, visually undetectable flaws through 
the thickness can be present in  annealed glass,  which necessitates a rigorous flaw- 
screening program. 
Annealed glass exhibits a characteristic called static fatigue, which is a degrada- 
tion of allowable s t r e s s  as a function of time at  load. Static fatigue is flaw growth 
caused by a combination of stress and environment and is sometimes referred to as 
stress corrosion. Water o r  moisture is a pr ime contributor to s t r e s s  corrosion of 
glass.  
. 
Tempering in  glass is a process that puts the surface in compression, thus elim- 
inating surface tensile s t resses .  Thermal tempering resul ts  in a parabolic residual 
stress distribution through the glass thickness with a compressive stress on the exter- 
nal surface approximately twice that of the tensile s t r e s s  at  the middle of the glass. 
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Chemical tempering has a much higher compression-to-tension ratio, but the compres- 
sive layer is much thinner than with thermal tempering. 
The strength of both tempered and annealed glass is defined by the modulus of 
rupture (MOR), which is the short-time breaking s t r e s s  of glass caused by bending in  
a moist environment. The MOR is generated fo r  each type of glass by using abraded 
test  samples to decrease the data scatter.  The MOR values are used for design by the 
glass industry for both annealed and tempered glass. The type of abrasion is assumed 
to represent the worst flaw to be expected in  the glass.  The MOR of tempered glass 
the glass if it were annealed. The lower limit strength of polished samples is approxi- 
mately the same as for abraded samples. 
i . 
I 
I 
consists of the residual s t r e s s  in  the glass at the flaw tip plus the inherent strength of . 
COMMAND MODULE WINDOWS 
The CM has five double-pane windows: one hatch window, two side windows, and 
two rendezvous windows (fig. 1). Each of these windows consists of inner-pressure- 
vessel  and heat-shield windows as shown in figures 2 ,  3,  and 4.  Four single-pane win- 
dows were located in  the CM guidance and navigation (G&N) optics. In this report ,  the 
CM windows are separated into four categories: inner structure,  heat shield, G&N, 
and instrument windows. Because the G&N and instrument window problems were sim- 
ilar for the CM and LM, they a r e  discussed in  a section that applies to both. 
Side 
Side window 
Rendezvous window 
Hatch windowJ -> LRendezvous window 
t x  
Hatch window 
Rendezvous window 
Side window 
Rendezvous window 
-X 
Outboard 
L l n j e c t e d  elastomerL Dry  nitrogen, 7.0psia 
Figure 2. - Command module side 
windows (1 and 5). 
Figure 1. - Command module window 
designation. 
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Figure 3 .  - Command module rendez- 
vous windows (2 and 4). 
Figure 4. - Command module hatch 
window (3) .  
I n ne r -  S t ruc tu re  Windows 
Design philosophy. - The structural  design philosophy adopted for the CM inner 
structure,  which is the CM primary pressure vessel ,  was that all windows would be 
double-pane windows for  redundancy -and made of tempered glass.  The cavity between 
the two panes would be evacuated and backfilled to 7.0 psia with a dry inert  gas. The 
windows were to be mounted to preclude installation stresses, thus restricting the 
glass loading to differential pressure.  The frames were to be designed to res t r ic t  the 
window loads to those induced by pressure on the window. 
Design cr i ter ia .  - The structural  design cr i ter ia  used for the Apollo CM inner- 
structure windows were different from those used throughout the aerospace industry, 
including those used for the Mercury and Gemini spacecraft. In general, a factor of 
safety of 3 .0  w a s  required, based on the MOR of the glass used. Also, the limit pres-  
sure  was usually the maximum pressure  that could exist during the mission, excluding 
any failures.  The factor of safety required fo r  the CM inner-structure windows was 
1.5, based on the residual compressive s t r e s s  in the glass caused by tempering. The 
CM windows were thus designed so that the glass surfaces had zero tension s t r e s s  at  
ultimate load. Because the CM windows were double pane and the cavity between the 
panes was at less  than atmospheric pressure,  the possibility existed that the windows 
could have developed a prelaunch leak and be subjected to 14.7 psid limit p ressure  in  
space, assuming a check-valve leak. Because the pressure  in  the window cavity was  
not verified after installation, the cri terion was adopted that the design limit pressure 
would take into account a check-valve sea l  leakage failure. Therefore, a l l  CM double- 
pane windows were designed for a 14.7 psid limit pressure across  each pane. . 
Description. - All CM inner-structure windows were made of aluminosilicate glass 
. and were thermally tempered to 25 000 psi  MOR for the hatch and side windows and to 
23 200 psi MOR for the rendezvous window. The two panes in each of the windows had 
the same thickness: 0.23, 0.25, and 0.20 inch for the hatch, side, and rendezvous 
windows, respectively. To accomplish the s t ress-free mounting and to provide a seal ,  
a silicone elastomer was injected around the edge of each pane and cured in place. 
This construction essentially potted the windows in their f rames.  After the seal  had 
been cured, the volume between the double-pane inner-structure window was evacuated 
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and backfilled with dry nitrogen to 7 .0  psia. Each inner-structure window was coated 
on both sides with a high-efficiency, antireflection (HEA) coating (fig. 5). 
Outboard -@ Magnesium fluoride coating 
Figure 5. - Command module window- 
surface notation. 
Qualification. - The qualification tests 
for the inner-structure windows consisted 
primarily of strength and deflection tes ts  
and mission-life pressure-leak tes ts .  The 
strength tes ts  were conducted on windows 
abraded to simulate the maximum expected 
surface flaws. The design limit p ressure  
for the inner-structure windows was 
14.7 psid, which assumed a check-valve 
leak of one of the window seals. Five 
strength tests were performed on each con- 
figuration, the last of which was a failure 
test. The pressures  at  failure for  the hatch 
window, side window, and rendezvous win- 
dow were 29.5, 29.7, and 32.5 psid, re- 
spectively. These strength tes ts  were 
performed on abraded, uncoated windows. 
It was assumed that the coatings did not 
affect the window strength. This assump- 
tion later was proved invalid, and additional qualification tes ts  to determine the effects 
of the coatings were required. These tes ts  are  discussed in the section of this report 
entitled "Problems. " 
Heat- S h ie I d W i n dow s 
Design philosophy. - The initial structural design philosophy for the CM heat- 
shield windows w a s  that all windows subjected to the entry environment would be single- 
pane windows made of annealed, fused silica glass. However, an outer pane, also of 
annealed fused silica, was provided to protect each heat-shield window from micro- 
meteoroid impact while in space. These micrometeoroid windows were not required to 
withstand the entry environment. Later in  the program, the micrometeoroid windows 
were omitted to reduce weight. 
Design cr i ter ia .  - The primary structural design criterion for the CM heat-shield 
windows was a factor of safety of 1 .5 ,  based on the sandblasted, annealed, fused sil ica 
MOR degraded for  the time at  load. The heat-shield windows are exposed to stress for  
approximately 15 minutes during entry, and the primary loading is thermal. The time 
used to determine the allowable strength (considering flaw growth) was 1 hour. The 
criterion generally required by the aerospace industry is a design factor of safety of 
3 with a proof factor of 2,  based on the MOR of abraded (sandblasted) glass.  The struc- 
tural  degradation of glass caused by s t r e s s  and humidity can cause problems during 
proof testing that can be misinterpreted. Also, the proof test can contribute to flaw 
growth. The structural  criterion for annealed windows in  the CM was a lower factor 
of safety based on a more realistic structural allowable and a limit s t r e s s  that included 
worst-case conditions. 
, 
. 
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Description. - Each of the five CM heat-shield windows consisted of a 0.7-inch- 
thick single pane made of fused amorphous sil ica.  Each pane was insulated around the 
silicone elastomer bonding agent). The insulation was flexible enough to allow the edges 
! 
edge by a thermal insulator encapsulated by a 0.02-inch-thick Fiberglas layer (using a 
of the glass to rotate. The 0.080-inch-thick 17-4 P H  steel  f rame and retainer were de- 
signed so that the flat glazing could be installed on the conical heat shield. A 0.05-inch 
gap was provided on all edges between the insulation and frame to allow the shell  to con- 
t ract  i n  the cold-soak environment without loading the glass. Each heat-shield window 
was coated as shown in figure 5. 
I 
, 
I 
. 
Qualification. - The qualification tes ts  for the heat-shield windows consisted of 
strength tes ts  for  the appropriate abort design conditions and a thermal test  of the de- 
sign entry condition from an initial cold-soak condition. Limit pressure  tests to -5.5 
and +11.14 psid and ultimate pressure tes ts  to -8.3 and +16.7 psid were conducted on 
each of the three window configurations. The analytical and test-temperature differen- 
tials between the inner and outer surfaces of the heat-shield window were 1600°, 930", 
and 1130" F for the hatch, rendezvous, and side windows, respectively. 
Quality Control 
To screen flaws, each of the Apollo CM windows was subjected to an acceptance 
program. The acceptance tes ts  for each window included thermal-shock tes ts ,  pres-  
sure  tests,  and visual inspections. 
The thermal-shock test  of the heat-shield windows consisted of heating the win- 
dows in  an oven to 1200" F and quenching in 68" to 77" F water. The thermal-shock 
test of the inner-structure windows consisted of heating the windows in a salt  bath to 
500" F and quenching in 68" to 77" F water.  Although the s t r e s ses  in a window caused 
by the thermal-shock test a r e  difficult to predict, the test  screens f laws over the entire 
surface of the window, which is important for heat-shield windows because of the ther- 
mal loading. 
Each inner-structure and heat-shield window pane was subjected to a proof- 
pressure  acceptance test to screen flaws. The proof-test p ressure  fo r  all inner- 
structure windows was 22 psi. For the heat-shield windows, the pressures  were 49 psi  
for the hatch window, 40 psi for the side window, and 73 psi for the rendezvous window. 
Windows were visually inspected to ensure that they were not damaged subsequent to the 
proof test .  It was assumed that the surface would have to be visibly damaged f o r  the 
window to be significantly flawed. 
The CM window proof-test requirements were reevaluated subsequent to the MSC 
study that determined a general lack of understanding of glass structural  characterist ics 
among window designers. The proof -test requirements were reevaluated using fracture  
mechanics technology (ref. 2) and rational analysis techniques. Although proof tes t s  
for  some conditions were not of the magnitude that would be used if  the windows were 
being designed (specifically, a proof test to 1 .5  of the operating s t r e s s  instead of a 
value derived f rom fracture  mechanics), the windows were determined to be acceptable 
for crew safety and mission success .  
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P rob1 e m s 
As previously stated, an initial assumption w a s  made that the optical coatings 
applied to the windows did not degrade their structural capability; therefore, the win- 
dow qualification tes ts  were conducted using uncoated, abraded windows. This assump- 
tion was proved invalid during coating crazing anomaly, and additional qualification test- 
ing of the coated windows was required to verify their flightworthiness. 
To improve the optical properties of the CM heat-shield hatch window for the lunar 
multispectral photography experiment (S-158) on Apollo missions 13, 14, and 15, the 
available hatch windows were surveyed to find those with acceptable optical properties, 
Two heat-shield side windows with acceptable properties were found, and it was decided 
to remove the coatings and cut hatch windows from these side windows. At that time, 
the hatch scientific window could have no coatings because of the S-158 experiment op- 
tical requirements. The "no coating?' requirement w a s  removed later for the Apollo 14 
mission because the S-158 experiment on that flight was  rescheduled to the Apollo 15 
mission. The f i r s t  side window was  damaged during the polishing procedure to remove 
the coatings. The second window was cut to size, and both the magnesium fluoride and 
the blue-red (BR) coatings were left on the window. In the thermal-shock test, the win- 
dow was heated in air to 1200" F for 45 minutes and immediately immersed in room- 
temperature tapwater. The BR coating crazed and cracks propagated through the 
tension layer developed by the thermal gradient of the glass on the underside of the BR 
coating. Later,  an entire side window from spacecraft 014 was tested in a similar 
manner to verify that the cutting of the window had not caused the crazing; similar re- 
sults were obtained. 
. 
In August 1970, three coupon tests were conducted, one of which was  thermally 
shocked in  room temperature water and two of which were slow cooled in air. The fol- 
lowing conclusions were reached. 
1. The BR coating crazing is temperature dependent. 
2 .  The BR coating crazing is independent of window size or  cooling rate .  
3. The BR coating crazing occurs during cooling. 
4. Window glass fracture sometimes occurs when the BR coating crazes ,  but 
does not occur without i t .  
To determine the minimum temperature at  which the heat-shield window coating 
crazes ,  a se r i e s  of tes ts  was conducted on 2- by 7-inch samples cut f rom a space- 
craft 017 heat-shield side window. The results of these tes ts  indicated that the thresh- 
old temperature for BR coating crazing is 450" to 500" F. A separate series of tests 
was  conducted on 3- by 3-inch samples cut from a spacecraft 014 heat-shield rendez- 
vous window and also determined that BR coating crazing occurs at approximately 
500" F. 
The decision was made to continue using the coated windows and to conduct a 
delta qualification test program to verify the adequacy of these windows at  newly pre-  
dicted flight temperatures. The maximum flight temperature on the inner surface of 
the heat-shield window was  predicted to be 362" F. Because the coating crazing was 
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determined to be caused by peak temperature and not thermal gradient, i t  was proposed 
that the heat-shield windows be tested to a maximum temperature of 462" F to account 
for  variations in  oven temperature and the temperature a t  which the coating was depos- 
ited. Three heat-shield side windows were heated in an oven to 462" F to represent 
worst-case flight temperatures, and the windows were then pressure tested on both 
sides to verify adequate structural capability for  the remaining flight loads. The pro- 
gram was completed successfully and the coated heat-shield windows were considered 
. flight qualified. 
A test program was also conducted to verify that the coating process did not sig- 
nificantly degrade the structural capability of the tempered glass windows. Three hatch 
windows were pressurized to 23 psig on each side separately to verify that the coating 
process did not degrade the windows and that the windows would pass  the acceptance 
test .  The three hatch windows were pressure tested to failure, which occurred at  47, 
42, and 41 psig in  a humid environment. 
I 
LUNAR MODULE WINDOWS 
The LM has four windows in  its primary structure.  The two forward windows are 
located in  the cabin front-face bulkhead. The docking window is located in the upper 
section of the cabin wall. Each window contains two panes with the cavity between the 
panes vented to the external environment. In this configuration, only the inner pane of 
each window was subjected to the cabin pressure  loading. The fourth window in the 
primary structure is the G&N window (optical telescope) and is discussed in another 
section. 
I 
Design Philosophy 
The structural design philosophy for the LM windows w a s  to provide a window of 
minimum weight with maximum crew visibility, which led to the selection of the single- 
pane-window concept using chemically tempered glass. The design consisted of a single 
structural  pane and an external pane for micrometeoroid and radiation protection. 
I Design Cr i te r ia  
The basic structural  design requirement was that the windows had to sustain the 
, environment imposed on them by the cabin with the primary loads attributable to the 
pressure and thermal environment. The design limit pressure,  the maximum cabin 
relief valve pressure,  was 5.8 psid. The design ultimate factor of safety was 2.0. 
. However, the minimum acceptable MOR bending modulus (strength) of the glass,  sub- 
sequent to all manufacturing processes,  w a s  specified to be 50 000 psi. This strength 
corresponds to a factor of safety of approximately 7.2, based on the s t r e s s  at  design- 
limit pressure.  The thermal environment imposed on the windows was +350" to -90" F. 
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, I Description 
two 25- by 28- by 24-inch triangular forward windows located in the front-face bulk- 
head of the forward cabin section were installed in  the vehicle in  a plane oblique to the 
vehicle axes to provide an approximate visibility of 65" down and 80" outboard. These 
windows provided the required visibility during the lunar descent, lunar landing, and 
lunar stay phases of the mission. Each window consists of two panes separated by a 
cavity vented to the external space environment. A cross  section of the edge of this 
window is shown in figure 7. The outer (nonstructural) pane w a s  a micrometeoroid- and 
. 
An overhead docking window is located on the left side of the vehicle directly over 
the commander's head. The window provides the commander with the required visibil- 
ity during the initial phase of the descent to the lunar surface and during the final phase 
of the docking maneuver. The docking window has  approximately 65 square inches (5 by 
13 inches) of viewing area. The construction of this rectangular window, shown in fig- 
u re  8, was similar to that of the forward 
windows. One exception w a s  that i t s  inner 
structural  pane was not floating; it was 
bolted to the cabin skin by a metallic edge 
member bonded to the chemically tempered 
glass.  An additional difference was that 
the inner pane of the docking window was 
curved to match the 92-inch diameter of the 
cabin instead of being flat as the forward 
tective cover' lpolycarbonate) 
Mach'ned'vlndow 
Cushion 
Local 
machined boss 
Protective cover 
Outboard 
1 'Removed before launch 
Figure 6. - Lunar module window Figure 7. - Cross  section of edge of LM 
location. forward window. 
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windows are. The forward windows a r e  floating and ca r ry  only pressure loads. The 
forward windows were designed to support the cabin pressure as a plate. The docking 
window is integral to the cabin structure and is therefore subjected to all loads sup- 
ported by the cabin in addition to the pressure loads. The docking window was designed 
to support the cabin loads as a membrane. However, the cabin loads in the vicinity of 
the window (because of other applied loads) are small  when compared to the pressure 
. load. 
The LM windows had three different coatings applied to the glass (fig. 9). An elec- 
. t r ical  conductive coating (ECC) was applied to the outboard surface of each inner pane. 
An electrical connection was made to the silver bus bar  on each side of the window to 
provide the ECC current.  The bus bars  on the forward windows were powered at  45 to 
76 watts to defog the panel. The inner docking window was  smaller and therefore re- 
quired only 18 to 24 watts to defog the panel. The ECC was applied evenly on the dock- 
ing window but unevenly on the forward window to obtain the required electrical power 
and thermal dissipation needed to defog the panels. The approximate thickness of the 
ECC was 400 to 700 angstroms for the forward window and 2500 angstroms for the dock- 
ing window. The original light transmission of the chemically tempered glass before 
the ECC was applied was approximately 88 percent. After ECC application, light trans- 
mission was reduced to approximately 76 percent. To increase the light transmission 
and decrease the reflection caused by the ECC, an HEA coating was applied to the in- 
board surface of each inner and outer pane. When a pane was completely coated and a 
black edge (black velvet paint) was applied to the periphery, the light transmission was 
increased to approximately 82 percent and the reflection was reduced from approxi- 
mately 14 percent to 5 percent. A final BR coating w a s  applied to the outer surface 
of each outer pane to res t r ic t  the amount of infrared and ultraviolet light to the cabin. 
Protective cover' 
Protective cover 
Fiberglas retainers 
Pressure vessel 
+ 
Outboard 
*Removed before launch 
Vycor Chemcor 
Outboard - 
Silver bus bar 7 
Pigtail 
Pigtail -7 -Silver bus bar 
Reticle 
Kovar frame Upper docking panel 
Figure 8. - Cross section of LM upper Figure 9. - Lunar module window 
docking window. coatings. 
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Qualification 
The LM windows were originally qualified for space flight at both the component 
and vehicle level. The component level tes ts  consisted of both functional and structural  
tests.  Functional tes ts  showed the optical and electrical aspects of the windows, where- 
as the structural  tes ts  included tests for leakage, shock, acoustics, thermal-vacuum, 
and humidity. 
The vehicle level tes ts  were accomplished as par t  of the LM structural  vehicle 
test  program. In this test  program, the windows were exposed to design environment 
conditions, including pressure,  vibration, and landing loads. No problems concerning 
the windows were encountered during the component o r  vehicle level tests.  
. 
Probl em s 
Forward window test  failure. - In December 1967 during a factory checkout pres-  
su re  test on the LM-5 ascent stage cabin, a forward window failed at a cabin pressure 
of 5 .1  psid. The pane was completely destroyed, which is consistent with the failure 
mode of tempered glass. The subsequent investigation revealed no abnormal conditions; 
it was concluded that the most likely cause of the failure was an undetected flaw in the 
glass.  This pressure test  of LM-5 was the first time the window glass had been exposed 
to the correct  s t r e s s  distribution. Previous structural acceptance tests on the windows 
consisted of a mechanical flexure test (fig. 10) on the forward windows and a thermal- 
shock test on the docking window. The mechanical flexure test was accomplished three 
times on both sides of each panel (each corner on rol ler  1). The flexure test stressed 
the pane to a maximum of approximately 30 000 psi, which demonstrated a factor of 
safety of approximately 5 over normal operating stress. However, this test  did not 
s t ress  the corners  of the pane, which were 
the areas of maximum s t r e s s  in  the vehicle. 
Because the docking window w a s  curved, a 
thermal- shock acceptance test was required 
instead of a mechanical flexure test. The 
s t ress  level experienced during thermal 
shock was approximately 20 000 psi, which 
demonstrated a factor of safety of approxi- 
Roller mately 7.  To reestablish confidence in  the 
structural integrity of the LM windows, 
many engineering evaluation tests were con- 
ducted. A summary of the tests conducted, 
including the purpose, condition, and re- 
sults, is given in table I. These tes ts  showed 
the structural  integrity of the window glass  
and the window-support structure. The 
structural integrity was sufficient if glass 
with cri t ical  defects was not used in  the 
spacecraft. Two steps were taken to guar- 
antee that defective glass was not installed. 
Applied load 
The first step was to modify the acceptance 
test to include a pressure test on each struc- 
tural pane in  a test  fixture simulating the 
Figure 10. - Lunar module win- 
dow flexure tests.  
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TABLE I. - LUNAR MODULE WINDOW TEST RESULTS 
Test 
Stress data 
Ultimate pressure 
test 
Fatigue test on 
docking panel 
Fatigue test on 
forward panel 
Impact test on for- 
ward panel 
Impact test on 
docking panel 
Scratch test 
Thermal shock on 
docking panel 
Purpose 
~~ ~ 
To establish s t ress  pattern 
on forward inner panel. 
To determine the pressure 
required to fail an inner 
forward panel. Three 
vehicle and five rejected 
panels were used. 
To determine the structural 
integrity of the inner dock 
ing panel when subjected 
to a ser ies  of pressure 
cycles. 
To determine the structural 
integrity of the forward 
inner panel when subjectec 
to a ser ies  of pressure 
cycles. 
To determine the energy 
level required to fail an 
inner forward panel when 
subjected to a dynamic 
impact. 
To determine the energy 
level required to fail an 
inner docking panel when 
subjected to a dynamic 
impact. 
To determine the relation of 
glass strength to scratch 
size. 
To demonstrate the struc- 
tural integrity of the inner 
docking panel after it has 
been subjected to a rapid 
change in temperature. 
Condition 
Pressurized with gaseous ni- 
trogen from 0 to 25 psid. 
Pressurized with water until 
failure. 
Ten cycles to 15 psid. 500 cy- 
cles to 5 .8  psid. Ten cy- 
cles to 15 psid. Taken to 
destruction. Pressurized 
with water. Cycle s ta r t s  
at 0 psid. 
Ten cycles to 25 psid. 500 cy- 
cles to 5.8 psid. Ten cy- 
cles to 25 psid. Taken to 
destruction. Pressurized 
with water. Cycle s ta r t s  
at 0 psid. 
Vacuum fixture to produce a 
5 .8  psid. Impact panel at 
various speeds and loca- 
tions. Weight - 11.6 lb 
with a protruding 1/8 in. 
radius point. 
Vacuum fixture to produce a 
5.8 psid. Impact panel at 
various speeds and loca- 
tions. Weight - 1.63 lb 
with a protruding 1/8 in. 
radius point. 
Specimen w a s  scratched at 
1/2-lb increments using a 
3-mil radius point traveling 
at 12.5 linear inches per 
minute. Specimens were 
then taken to destruction. 
At 5 Ib, the diamond point 
chipped. Specimen size - 
0.190 by 1 by 10 in. 
Panel was heated to 350" F 
for 20 minutes, then 
dropped into a 65" F water 
bath. 
Results 
Panel underwent s t ress  of ap. 
proximately f 36 000 psi 
at the three corners when 
pressurized to 25 psid. 
Panel failure occurred at a 
range from 78 to 96 psid. 
Panel survived cycling test. 
During the destruct tes t ,  
panel failed at 55 psid. 
Panel survived cycling test. 
During the destruct tes t ,  
panel failed at 71 psid. 
Panel survived impact at 
lower velocity. Failure 
occurred at the corner on 
the 18th impact with a ve- 
locity of 9 ft/sec 
(14.8 ft/lb). 
Panel survived impact at 
lower velocity. Failure 
occurred on the 13th im- 
pact with a velocity of 
8 ft/sec (1.63 ft/lb). 
Failure occurred at edge on 
the 1/2- to 3-1/2-lb 
scratch. No decrease in 
MOR value (average 
82 R30 psi). Failure oc- 
curred at scratch location 
on the 4- and 4-1/2-lb 
scratch specimen. De- 
crease in MOR value 
(average 70 200 psi, 4-lb 
specimens and 25 800, 
4-1/2-lb specimens). 
Panel survived test. Panel 
destruct at 64 psid. 
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TABLE 1. - LUNAR MODULE WINDOW TEST RESULTS - Concluded 
Test 
Thermal shock on 
forward panel 
Temperature cy- 
cling on forward 
and docking 
panels 
compatibility 
Oxygen 
Purpose 
To compare the structural 
integrity between chemi- 
cally tempered glass and 
tempered soda-lime glass. 
To demonstrate the ability 
of the inner panels to sus- 
tain a thermal cycling at  
a constant 7.7  psid. 
To demonstrate the struc- 
tural integrity of a for- 
ward window when 
subjected to combined 
environment of oxygen, 
elevated temperatures, 
high humidity, and 
pressure. 
Condition 
Panels were heated i n  a kiln 
temperature of 464" F for  
a period of 20 minutes. 
Panels were dropped into a 
64' F water bath then pres-  
surized to failure. 
Panels were subjected to ther- 
mal cycling, hot and cold 
soaks, for 220 hours be- 
tween -90' F and 350" F. 
The panels were exposed to a 
temperature of 225" -I 5' F 
and a 90 to 100 percent rel- 
ative humidity in  a pure 
oxygen atmosphere. The 
test was conducted with a 
differential pressure of 
25.0 psid for 72 hours and 
11.6  psid for  144 hours. 
Results 
Chemically tempered glass 
survived test. Soda-lime 
glass developed spalls and 
cracks on edge. Chemi- 
cally tempered glass panel 
failed at 22 psid. On 
another run, results were 
identical. Chemically 
tempered glass failed at 
85 psid. 
Panels survived test, which 
simulated all phases of the 
LM flight including lunar 
stay. 
Panels survived tests. 
Panels destructed at  
90 psid and 82 psid. 
spacecraft installation. The acceptance test pressure imposed on the panes was  25 psid 
for the forward windows and 15 psid for the docking window. These pressures corre- 
spond to proof factors of 5 and 3 above operating pressure for the two windows, and 
these proof factors are consistent with requirements based on fracture mechanics tech- 
niques. The docking window test pressure was restricted to 15 psid to prevent yielding 
of the metallic edge member. In addition to the improved acceptance tests,  the second 
step taken was to redesign the window, glass protective covers to provide maximum pro- 
tection from acceptance until launch. Before the acceptance tests were conducted, a 
polycarbonate protective cover, retainer, and glass pane were installed as a subassem- 
bly in the pressure-test fixture. The pressure test was  then performed to the proper 
pressure for 2 to 5 minutes. After the pressure test ,  the subassembly was  removed 
from tile fixture and an additional protective cover was  installed on the opposite side 
to provide a handling and transportation protective cover assembly. The outer covers 
remained on each pane until the outer pane was installed. The two covers were not re-  
moved from the vehicle until just before launch, which provided maximum protection 
against inadvertent damage from workmen i n  and around the vehicle. 
No vehicle windows have failed since the revised acceptance test procedures and 
new protective covers were implemented. Eight windows (seven forward and one dock- 
ing) have failed in  acceptance tests. The range of failing pressure on the forward win- 
dow was 5 .0  to 24.8  psid. The only docking window failure occurred at 11.6 psid. 
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Window heater electrical connection. - A forward window bus bar  arced during the 
factory checkout test  of the electrical heater on LM-8.  Failure analysis revealed the 
glass was spalled under the bus bar ,  causing the arc when electrical power was applied. 
A detailed inspection conducted on other LM windows revealed discolorations that indi- 
cated spalling. 
IV 
X 
x x  
39 240 
The configuration of the electrical 
connection to the bus bar for  the window 
heater is shown in figure 11. The bus bar 
was a strip of silver paste fused into the 
glass along the edge of two sides of each 
window. The electrical wire was subse- 
quently soldered to the bus bar .  To pro- 
vide strain relief to the solder connection, 
an overlay of epoxy was applied. After the 
addition of the solder and epoxy to the win- 
dows, the window was exposed to various 
manufacturing processes that elevated the 
window temperature. Because of the dif-  
ference in the thermal coefficient of expan- 
sion between the glass,  solder, and epoxy, 
residual s t resses  were induced into the 
glass. Analysis indicated that the magni- 
tude of thermal stress was sufficient to re-  
lieve the compressive s t resses  in  the outer 
layer of the chemically tempered glass, 
thereby reducing the strength of the glass. 
An extensive test program was conducted 
to verify the cause of the spalling. The 
MOR test matrix is presented in  table 11. 
L. 
' 
Detail A 
Bus bar 
f  
1 \ 
Figure 11. - Lunar module window 
heater electrical connection. 
v VI 
x x x  
x x x  
X 
X 
X 
x x x  
x x x  
74 230 53 130 
TABLE U .  - LUNAR MODULE GLASS MOR TEST SPECIMEN MATRIX 
Group 
ECC and bus bar 
Solder wire to bus bar 
9 - lb  pull test on wire 
Add epoxy to soldered joint 
Hot soak at 250" F,  1 hr 
Hot soak at 150" F ,  1 hr 
I 
X 
x x  
X 
x x  
x x  
1 l X l X  Flex test three t imes  at 18 367 psi 
Cold soak at -10" F ,  1 hr 
Remove epoxy and wire 
MOR average destruct 
test, psi 
x x  
88 490 48 210 40 15( 
VI1 
X 
X 
X 
X 
5 710 
VIU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
87 02( 
- 
14 
~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ 
The test program, conducted on 35 MOR test bars, consisted of control samples (with- 
out solder and epoxy) and various combinations of solder, epoxy, and electrical wire 
pull tests. The samples were exposed to various thermal and flexure environments and 
then loaded to failure. The test results (table III) indicate a significant reduction in 
strength for the bars with the solder and epoxy attached and substantiate the stress 
analysis. Because the problem was caused by the presence of epoxy and solder, it was 
decided to redesign the electrical connection to eliminate any potential source of 
strength degradation caused by induced residual s t resses  o r  flaw. generators. The test 
d 
X C  
TABLE m. - RESULTS OF TEST PROGRAM FOR LM FORWARD WINDOW HEATER BUS BAR FAILURE 
[Proof pressure ai 25 psid equivalent to 32 000 psi Stress . ]  
Bus bar Solder 
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x x  
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  
x x  
x x  
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
x x  X 
__ 
rlOR bar 
1 
2 
3 
4 
__ 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 Lo -10 
250 to -10 
150 to -10 
150 to -10 
150 to -10 
150 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to - i r  
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
250 to -10 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
- 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
18 
I9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
31 
35 
- 
- 
__ 
uiI test 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
~ 
~ 
X 
X 
X 
X - 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Epoxy overcoat extremes, F 
loom temperature 
loom temperature 
loom temperature 
‘ailure s tress ,  
psi 
85 000 
89 000 
92 000 
85 000 
76 000 
28 000 
66 000 
21 000 
41 000 
43 000 
46 000 
31 000 
38 000 
49 000 
37 000 
39 000 
30 000 
18 000 
70 000 
78 000 
31 000 
59 000 
48 000 
73 000 
83 000 
86 000 
87 000 
89 000 
89 000 
93 000 
85 000 
86 000 
81 000 
82 000 
85 000 
Remarks 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Control 
_ _ _  
Control 
Control 
Control 
Strip epoxy, unsolder 
lead, and etch spalls 
on specimens 28 to 35 
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program included specimens with solder and epoxy applied that were exposed to the 
flexure and temperature environment and then the solder and epoxy were removed. 
These specimens showed that the original strength was reestablished if  the solder and 
epoxy were removed. 
The electrical connection to the bus bar was redesigned to eliminate the solder 
and epoxy. The new electrical connection was achieved by a beryllium copper spring- 
loaded electrical contact as shown in figures 12 and 13. The window panes in LM-7 and 
subsequent vehicles were removed f rom the vehicles and the solder and epoxy were re- 
and reinstalled in the vehicles. 
f 
. moved from the panes. Following the rework, the panes were proof-pressure tested 
Bery l l ium copper leaf Beryll,um 
Section A A  
To power source 
Window st ructure - 
Contact area (gold 
o r  rhodium platedl 
'L B u s  bar on I i n n e r  window 
Outer window I 
Bery l l ium copper leal 
spring (coated) 
Fiberglasl 
Bery l l ium copper 
coil spring 
I (coated1 
l n ~ e r  window 
Figure 12. - Revised forward window 
heater electrical connection. 
Figure 13. - Revised docking window 
heater electrical  connection. 
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION WINDOWS I 
There were four single-pane windows in  the CM optical unit assembly and one 
single-pane window in the LM alinement optical telescope. These windows were not 
considered part of the structural  subsystem during the structural  qualification of the 
CM and LM because they were located in the optics of the G&N system. These windows 
did not receive rigorous structural  qualification and acceptance testing consistent with 
the other windows because they were defined as optics rather than windows. In general, 
there was a lack o r  decrease in structural  qualification and acceptance test  rigor when 
glass was used in design by disciplines other than s t ructures .  For  future programs, 
' 
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all structural  glass used in  spacecraft windows o r  instruments should be evaluated and 
verified structurally by cognizant personnel. 
The optical unit and the alinement telescope windows were reviewed, and a frac-  
ture mechanics analysis of each window was performed. The windows were determined 
to be structurally acceptable based on the leak test (14.7 psid) that had been performed. 
The threshold flaw size was greater than the thickness for each window, which indicated 
that these G&N windows would not fail catastrophically at the maximum operating pres-  
sure  of the CM and LM. It was also demonstrated that the leak rate  of the CM would 
remain within the emergency limits of the environmental control system if one of the 
pressure windows in the G&N optics system did fail catastrophically. 
INSTRUMENT WINDOWS 
During the initial inflight inspection of the LM on the Apollo 15 mission, the range/ 
range-rate instrument window was found to be broken. This instrument and all other 
instruments on the LM and CM are hermetically sealed with 1 atmosphere (14.7 psia) 
internal pressure.  Most of the LM and CM instrument windows, including the range 
indicator, are made of annealed soda-lime glass. The range indicator glass operating 
s t r e s s  (sustained load caused by differential pressure) was in excess of the allowable 
for static fatigue and therefore was the probable cause of the failure. 
Further investigation revealed additional instrument windows in both the LM and 
CM that were under excessive sustained s t r e s s  and that had been exposed to inadequate 
proof tes t  to ensure no failure by flaw growth. The approach used to remedy the inade- 
quate CM and LM instrument window designs was to install permanent covers o r  dou- 
blers over the highest s t ressed instrument windows and temporary covers over some 
of the lower s t ressed windows to protect the crew if a window failed. The probability 
of no window failure for each instrument window was calculated based on MOR test  data 
f rom the National Bureau of Standards. The effect of a failure of each instrument win- 
dow from flammability and operational standpoints was also evaluated. 
FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS OF GLASS 
A comprehensive introduction to fracture mechanics analysis is presented in ref-  
erence 2 .  Although not mentioned in  reference 2, f racture  mechanics is the best means 
known today to understand and evaluate the structural characterist ics of glass.  The 
fracture  mechanics techniques for analyzing glass are similar to those for analyzing 
metals presented in  reference 2.  
It is not generally recognized among design engineers that the strength of glass is 
a function of environment and flaw size. Also not generally recognized is the fact that 
flaws not visually detectable can be critical. Fracture mechanics provides a rational 
basis f o r  specifying the proof test required to verify that no flawsaare present that could 
induce failure at operating s t resses  during a mission. 
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Some of the limitations of the fracture  mechanics analysis a r e  discussed in  ref- 
erence 3. Because fracture  mechanics is not generally recognized as a method fo r  
analysis of glass, limited glass fracture mechanics data a r e  available. Wiederhorn at 
the National Bureau of Standards is one of the few experimenters who has published 
glass fracture mechanics data (ref. 4). Fracture mechanics data can vary with glass 
composition and environment and should be measured for the specific composition and . environment being evaluated. 
The fracture mechanics analytical techniques and proof-test methods presently 
. developed a r e  provided in reference 2. Some material  data and confirmation that f rac-  
ture  mechanics is a valid technique for analysis of glass a r e  provided in references 2 
and 3. All  proof tes ts  of glass should be performed in a dry or vacuum environment to 
reduce or eliminate flaw growth during the proof test .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The experience gained and the problems encountered in the design and verifica- 
tion of Apollo spacecraft windows demonstrate that there is a general lack of under- 
standing of glass structural characterist ics by design engineers and that there is a need 
for  adequate structural cr i ter ia .  The following i tems should be included in future win- 
dow structural requirements. 
1. All  spacecraft windows and glass structures,  including optics and instrument 
windows, should be structurally verified. 
2.  The rationale for proving the structural  integrity of glass should include a 
proof acceptance test to screen flaws. Fracture mechanics should be used to analyze 
glass that must car ry  s t ress ,  and acceptance proof tes ts  should be performed based on 
the fracture mechanics analysis. 
3. Coatings and bonded attachments tend to degrade the structural  integrity of 
glass and their use should be avoided. However, when coatings and bonded attachments 
are required, the windows should be thoroughly qualified in flight configuration and 
environments. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, July 2, 1973 
914-13-20-13-72 
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